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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The defendant-appellant was charged in the Fourth 
Judicial District Court in and for Juab County, State of Utah, 
by way of an amended information with two counts of Forcible 
Sexual Abuse in violation of Section 76-5-404, U.C.A. (1953}, 
as amended. 
'lhe first count of the amended information charged that 
the defendant did on or about the 4th day of August, 1979, at 
Nephi, Juab County, Utah, cause another to take indecent 
liberties with Toni Kennedy without her consent, with the intent 
to arouse or gratify the defendant's sexual desires. 
'lhe second count of the amended information charged that 
the defendant did on or about the 22nd day of August, 1979, at 
Nephi, Juab County, Utah, to take indecent liberties with Toni 
Kennedy without her consent, with the intent to arouse or gratify 
the defendant's sexual desires. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The defendant-appellant was found guilty of two counts 
of Forcible Sexual Abuse before the lower Court setting without 
a jury, in violation of Section 76-5-404, U.C.A. (1953), as 
amended, on the 27th day of November, 1979. 
After the matter was referred to the Adult Probation 
and Parole Department for a presentence investigation, the defen-
dant was sentenced on Count I and Count II to be confined in the 
Utah state Prison for an indeterminate term not to exceed five 
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(5) years on both counts with each sentence to run concurrently 
with one another. 
The lower Court denied the defendant's oral motion for a 
certificate of probable cause pursuant to Section 77-39-9, 
U.C.A. (1953), as amended. 
The lower Court previously denied the defendant's motion 
to Quash or in the alternative to dismiss the amended information 
on the 16th day of October, 1979, on the basis that Section 76-5-
404, U.C.A. (1953), as amended, was not so indefinite and vague 
as to violate the requirements of the Due Process of Law Require-
ments of the Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 7 and of 
the United States Constitution's Amendments V and XIV. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks reversal of the Fourth Judicial 
District Court Judgment, in and for Juab County, State of Utah, 
in that Section 76-5-404, U.C.A. (1953), as amended, is unconsti-
tutional insofar as it deals with indecent liberties in that such 
section is so indefinite and vague in defining the prohibited 
acts that it denies the appellant due process of law as defined 
by the Utah State Constitution and the Constitution of the United 
States. 
The appellant additionally seeks reversal of the lower 
Court's judgment in that the weight and sufficiency of the evidence 
produced at trial by the State of Utah against the appellant is so 
lacking and unsubstantial that reasonable men could not possibly 
reach guilty verdicts beyond a reasonable doubt in that the State 
of Utah failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the 
-~-
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appellant caused another to take indecent liberties with Toni 
Kennedy, his wife, (2} without her consent as defined in Section 
76-5-406, U.C.A. (1953}, as amended, and (3) such acts, if any, 
were for the purpose and with the requisite intent to arouse or 
gratify the appellant's sexual desires. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At the preliminary hearing the State of Utah introduced 
over the appellant's objection an affidavit signed by one B.E. 
Marshall and indicated to the Court at such preliminary hearing 
that the State would produce Mr. Marshall at the trial of the 
appellant. 
Mr. Marshall was never called at the appellant's trial 
but his affidavit did indicate that Mr. Marshall did not know 
Mrs. Kennedy did not consent to his or Mr. Kennedy's actions, 
but merely going on to note that he observed numerous arguments 
between Mr. and Mrs. Kennedy during the four day period he was 
there without further explanation as to what the arguments were 
over. 
It should also be pointed out that no charges of rape 
were, to the very best of counsel's knowledge, ever filed against 
Mr. Marshall or the other individual she was alleged to be forced 
into having sex with, another man referred to as Rick. Additonal· 
ly, to the best of counsel's knowledge, no criminal action is 
pending or anticipated against either individual. 
The complainant, Mrs. Toni Kennedy, was married to the 
appellant at the time of the trial. 
Mrs. Kennedy testified against the appellant at the time 
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of trial and it is primarily her word which the Court chose to 
believe over the appellant's in which the Court found the appellant 
guilty. 
As will be discussed more thoroughly later, any sexual act 
she engaged in appeared to be for monitary remuneration rather 
than the sexual gratification of the defendant and it is difficult 
to see from reading the entire transcript of the trial how any 
sexual act she engaged in can be said to be against her consent 
as defined by the statute. 
Ps noted earlier, the appellant was charged and convicted 
of Forcible Sexual Abuse by allegedly forcing his wife, Toni 
Kennedy, to have sex with other men without her consent for the 
purpose and with the intent of arousing or gratifying the 
appellant's sexual desires. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE CHARGES AGAINST THE DEFENDANT SHOULD BE DISMISSED ON 
THE GROUNDS THAT THE LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE UNDER WHICH 
HE IS CHARGED ARE SO INDEFINITE AND VAGUE AS TO VIOLATE 
THE REQUIREMENTS OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW UNDER THE PRO-
VISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH, ARTICLE I, SECTION 
7, AND OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, AMEND-
MENT V AND AMENDMENT XIV. 
Section 76-5-404, U.C.A. 1953 (Supp. 1979}, provides: 
(11 A person commits forcible sexual abuse if, under 
circumstances not amounting to rape or sodomy, or 
attempted rape or sodomy, the actor touches the anus 
or any part of the genitals of another, or otherwise 
takes indecent liberties with another, or causes 
another to take indecent liberties with the actor or 
another, with the intent to cause substantial emotional 
or bodily pain to any person or with intent to arouse 
or gratify the sexual desire of any person, without the 
consent of the other, regardless of the sex of any 
participant. 
(2) Forcible sexual abuse is a felony of the third 
degree. 
charged under that language of the statute 
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which proscribes the taking of indecent liberties with another 
with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desires of any 
person. By his appeal, the defendant raises first the question 
whether his supposed conduct is included in the definition of 
"taking of indecent liberties with another." Could the legis-
lature have intended that such an act would fall under the same 
penalty as the other enumerated acts in the statute, e.g. the 
touching of the anus or genitals of another? Even more crucial, 
however, is the question whether the language of the statute is 
sufficiently explicit in its prohibition that the defendant could 
have known, before the commission of such an act, that it would 
subject him to prosecution for this third degree felony? 
The test for whether a statute is so indefinite as to 
violate due process requirements has been adequately stated by a 
number of United States Supreme Court decisions. In United States 
v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 72 S.Ct. 808, 98 L. Ed. 989 (1954), the 
Court considered whether the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act 
2 and S.C. Sections 305, 307, and 308, was too vague and indefinit 
As a test for vagueness, the Court stated: 
The constitutional requirement of definiteness is 
violated by a criminal statute that fails to give 
a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that 
his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute. 
The underlying principle is that no man shall be held 
criminally responsible for conduct which he could not 
reasonably understand to be proscribed. 347 U.S. at 
617, 74 s.ct. at 812. 
In Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 
2294, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1972), the Court elaborated upon the 
rationale behind the definiteness requirement, and stated: 
Vague laws offend several important values. First, 
because we assume that man is free to steer between 
lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws 
give the person of ordinary "1 ~-·u ~er~'.?' -~N~a~ able Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he 
may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the inno-
cent by not providing fair warning. Second, if 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be 
prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for 
those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly 
delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, 
and juries, for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective 
basis, with the attendant danger of arbitrary and 
discriminatory application. 408 U.S. at 108-109. 
The same rationale is repeated in Smith v. Goguen, 415 
U.S. 566, 94 s.ct. 1242, 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974), which consider-
ed whether a Massachusetts flag-abuse statute was unconstitutional-
ly vague. 
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted the same test for 
vagueness. In State v. Packard, 250 P.2d 561 (1952), the Court 
stated a three-pronged test, of which one of the factors may be 
viewed as a mere rewording of one another. The Court wrote: 
Concerning the question of uncertainty or vagueness 
of statutes, the authorities seem to be in accord 
that the test a statute must meet to be valid is: 
It must be sufficiently definite (a) to inform 
persons of ordinary intelligence, who would be law 
abiding, what their conduct must be to conform to 
its requirements, (b) to advise a defendant accused 
of violating it just what constitutes the offense 
with which he is charged, and (c) to be susceptible 
of uniform interpretation and application by those 
charged with responsibility of applying and en-
forcing it. 250 P.2d at 564. 
For the purposes of this appeal, the second factor of the 
Court's test is clearly includable in the first. Otherwise, the 
law clearly requires that a statute be sufficiently explicit 
that both the general public and the law enforcement establish-
ment would be able to know, without doubt or disagreement, 
precisely what conduct is prohibited. 
A further aspect of the vagueness test results from the 
following consideration: to say that due process requires that 
a statute be sufficiently precise to give fair notice to a Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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person that his contemplated conduct is prohibited, or that it 
requires that a statute inform a person who would be law abiding 
what his conduct must be to conform to the law, implies the 
further rule that a statute will not be judged purely on its 
face nor on the basis of hypotheticals, but will be analyzed 
according to whether, under the facts and circumstances of the 
particular case, the defendant himself was given sufficient 
warning that his specific conduct was prohibited by the law. 
This rule, announced by the United States Supreme Court in 
United States v. National Dairy Producers' Corporation, 372 
U.S. 29, 83 S.Cte 594, 9 L.Ed.2d 561 (1963), as well as in other 
cases, means, for the purposes of this case, that the issue is 
whether U.C.A. 76-5-404 is sufficiently explicit that the defen-
dant should have known that his alleged conduct would be in-
cludable in this third degreee felony. The appellant submits 
that the statute is not sufficiently explicit, but rather that 
it is so ambiguous and indefinite that he could not have known 
prior to his alleged conduct that he could be charged under this 
section and that must be the fact notwithstanding the fact that 
he may have been charged under some other section of the criminal 
code nor the fact that the Court is offended by the occurrence. 
Jh order for the statute in question to meet the require-
ments of due process in this case, the language "indecent 
liberties" as used in the statute must not only be susceptible 
of some precise definition, but that definition must be so 
apparent or well established that ~ersons of ordinary intelligence 
in this jurisdiction could reasonably ascertain what the definitiOO 
is. 
definitions of statutory terms must o::=.=-------·-==~~ 
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one of three sources: common usage among those subject to the 
law; explanations by the judiciary, the legislature, or other 
authorities; and prior applications of the law to specific 
factual situations. (See Balthazar v. Superior Court, 573 F.2d. 
698 (1st Cir. 1978). Given any of these three factors, the 
language of a statute may be validly construed either to include 
or to exclude a particular act, and all interested parties will 
be held to a knowledge of that construction. But absent a 
common understanding of the meaning of terms, absent a relevant 
explanation by the legislature or the judiciary, and absent prior 
judicial decisions applying the language to similar conduct, a 
defendant cannot reasonably be expected to foresee the unlawful-
ness of his act. He would therefore have grounds to raise the 
objection of vagueness. 
Such is precisely the situation in this case. The term 
"indecent liberties" as used in the statute clearly cannot be 
said to include the acts which the Appellant is alleged to have 
done. 
Even if such an act were generally considered to be an 
"indecent liberty" in generic terms, it would not necessarily 
follow that the legislature meant by use of the same generic 
language to include it in the statute's prohibitions. An in-
finite variety of acts could be agreed generally to be "indecent 
liberties" but obviously not all such acts were intended by the 
legislature to invoke third degree felony penalties. Given that 
some "indecent liberties" must be excluded from coverage by the 
statute, the crucial question becomes whether it is corrunonly 
understood that the alleged actions of the Appellant is one of 
the acts meant to be included. It certainly seems that the State 
-8-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of Utah should have charged the appellant with rape as a 
principal under the aiding and abetting section of the criminal 
code if in fact it believed the appellant to have in fact done 
such acts. Because the statute refers specifically to only two 
other acts, the touching of the anus or genitals of another, it 
certainly cannot be reasonably concluded that everyone would 
understand that the alleged acts of the appellant is prohibited 
by the "other indecent liberties" language of this statute. 
Further, there have been neither judicial explanations, 
legislative reports, nor cases of record which have construed 
the Utah statute in question to include the acts which the 
appellant is charged with. Prior police practices are not 
sufficient, if they exist in this case, because the due process 
requirement would demand that authoritative construction of the 
language appear as of record before a defendant would be held 
liable for the knowledge that his act was prohibited under the 
statute. See Driscoll v. Schmidt, 354 F. Supp. 1225 (W.D.Wisc. 
197 3) • 
lbsent a general consensus as to what U.C.A. 76-5-404 
means by "indecent liberties," and absent any other authoritative 
definition of the terms, the appellant could not reasonably have 
known that such an act would be included in the statute, and his 
prosecution under the statute is void because of the violation 
of his rights to due process. Several cases of recent vintage 
present similar conclusions in the context of similar facts. 
In Balthazar v. Superior Court, supra, the First Circuit 
court of Appeals reviewed the habeas corpus petition of a defen-
dant convicted under the Massachusetts law prohibiting "unnatural 
and lascivious acts," Mass. Gen. Laws ·'.:;:~~ ~""7.·~=·="'"==:=---
.strict 
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Court affirmed. The Court discussed the three sources of 
statutory definitions, outlined above, and noted that in the 
present case none of the three sources supplied a sufficiently 
precise explanation of the terms as used in the statute. Al-
though both "unnatural acts" and "lascivious acts" were 
separately well defined terms in ordinary usage, when combined 
in the statute as if jointly to describe single acts, they created 
an ambiguity as to whether the defendant's conduct, fellatio and 
oral-anal contact, were included. The Court concluded: 
The general rule is that constitutional challenges 
of vagueness must be based on a statute's 
application to the particular case ... We so limit 
our decisions today to the question of whether [the 
statute] as applied to petitioner, gave him fair 
notice as required by due process standards that 
his conduct, i.e. fellatio and oral-anal contact, 
constituted an "unnatural and lascivious act" 
proscribed by criminal statute. * * * In light of 
the diversity of conduct that could conceivably 
be covered by the terms "unnatural" and "lascivious" 
and the fact that there are certainly acts that are 
less natural and more universally condemned than 
Balthazar's conduct, ... Balthazar could reason-
ably believe that the statute was aimed at other 
acts than his. 573 F. 2d at 700, 701. 
Thus, Balthazar illustrates that though the terms used 
by the statute, on their face and out of context, may have a 
generally accepted meaning in the community, when they are in-
corporated by the legislature into the statute together with 
other terms, their meanings may be changed, limited, and 
obscured in such a way that it becomes unreasonable to expect 
the ordinary person to understand precisely what is meant. As 
will be pointed out later, the defendant would certainly have 
had a chance at a trial guaranting that he would be afforded 
due process considerations if he had been charged under another 
section for the acts he allegedly committed. 
-10-
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Similarly, in the present case, although "indecent 
liberties" may have a generally accepted meaning in the community 
when used alone, when incorporated into the statute and made to 
relate to the other terms of that statute, the same term loses 
its generally accepted meaning, and the defendant cannot be held 
liable unless some other source of authority was sufficient to 
inform him that his alleged actions were included in the meaning 
of the statute. 
In Driscoll v. Schmidt, 354 F Supp. 1225 (W.D. Wisc. 
1973}, a defendant was charged with taking indecent liberties 
with the privates of a person under the age of 18. In a vague-
ness attack, the Court considered the question whether the defen-
dant, when he engaged in fellatio and cunnilingus with his step-
daughter, could have reasonably understood that his conduct was 
prohibited by the statute. The Court held the language of the 
statute vague, on its face, but found that in Wisconsin Jury 
Instructions #1527 and #1528 there were sufficient explanations 
of the terms to constitute fair warning to the defendant that 
his conduct was unlawful. 
In Miami Health Studios v. City of Miami Beach, 353 F. 
Supp. 593 (S.D.Fla. 1973), another Federal District Court dealt 
with the language of F. S .A. S 796. 07 (1) (b) (1971), which pro-
hibited lewd acts in certain places and stated: 
The term lewdness shall be construed to include 
any indecent or obscene act. 
In finding the statute unconstitutionally vague, the Court 
stated: 
In the Court's opinion,. [the statuteJ is so vague, 
indefinite, and uncertain as to render it violative 
of the petitioner's Fifth and Fourteenth AmAn0mont 
rights to due process of l~ ge, 
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particularly subsection (1) (b) thereof, is not so 
clearly and definitely expressed that a man or 
woman of common intelligence could determine in 
advance whether his or her contemplated act was 
within or without the law .... The Courts of 
Florida have provided no enlightenment with 
respect to construction of the statute in question, 
nor has there been authoritative interpretation of 
the particularly offending phrase, "'lewdness' shall 
be construed to include any indecent or obscene 
act," found in subsection (1) (b} of the statute. 
353 F. Supp. at 597-598. 
The case thus further illustrates that due process requires 
some authoritative pronouncement or interpretation of otherwise 
ambiguous terms. 
Jh District of Columbia v. Walters, 319 A.2d 332 (Ct.App. 
D.C. 1974), a District statute declared it unlawful to commit a 
"lewd, obscene, or indecent act." The defendant and eight others 
were arrested in a commercial establishment for engaging in acts 
of mutual masturbation. In discussing the interpretation of the 
statute, the Court referred to the testimony of the Director of 
Morals Division of the Metropolitan Police to the effect that he 
had neither received nor promulgated any guidelines as to the 
types of conduct included in the above statute. Other officers 
testified that the statute was generally applied against homo-
sexuals and that new officers were trained by reference to arrest 
and prosecution records, but that there was no other interpreta-
tion of the conduct inclu~ed in the terms. The trial court held 
that the statute was unconstitutionally vague, and the Appellate 
Court affirmed, stating: 
The statute betrays the classic defects of vague-
ness in that it fails to give clear notice of 
what conduct is forbidden and invests the police 
with excessive discretion to decide, after the fact, 
who has violated the law .... fT]here is a broad, 
gray area in which the words of the statute will 
convey substantially different standards to 
different pe<?ple, and by proscribing "any other lewd, 
or indecent act" the statute is so encyclo-
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pedic in its reach that the areas of reasonable 
disagreement are limitless. 319 A.2d at 335. 
Thus, Walters illustrates that although the conduct of 
the defendant would be considered lewd, obscene, or indecent 
under almost anyone's standards, where the constitutionality of 
a statute is in question, the real issue is whether the legis-
lature's use of those terms was meant to include the defendant's 
conduct, and whether, if so, the defendant reasonably could have 
known that the legislature so intended. In the present case, it 
may be clear that the community generally would agree that the 
allegations against the appellant if proved and if without the 
consent of the alleged victim would amount to an "indecent 
liberty." But the real question is whether the legislature's 
use of that generic term was meant to include such an act, and 
more importantly, whether the appellant could reasonably have 
known that the legislature intended to prohibit the conduct for 
which he is charged. It would seem that, for reasons stated 
above, the appellant could not reasonably have forseen that the 
statute under which he is charged and convicted would include his 
alleged conduct. 
A similar analysis was discussed in State v. Sharpe, 205 
N.E.2d 113 (Ct.App. Ohio 1965). There, a defendant was charged 
with soliciting an "unnatural sexual-act" under Ohio Rev. Code 
S 2905.30. The Court discussed the infinite biological and 
sociological range of sexual acts, enumerating many which are 
unnatural but clearly not immoral (e.g. birth control techniques, 
artificial insemination, etc.), but finding no cases or author-
ities to limit the term used in the statute. The ~ourt conclud~: 
In spite of the possibility that a trial jury may 
apply reason and discretion 
is and is not an unnatural 
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evidence of a specific case, the objection still 
exists that persons, innocent or otherwise, are 
obviously subject to arrest and prosecution 
under this statute without having any positive 
guide whereby the solicited or the solicitor 
may know whether the act proposed is unnatural. 
Even the policeman does not have a sufficient 
standard to determine whether what he may have 
seen or heard requires an arrest. 205 N.E. 2d 
at 114-115. 
The statute was therefore held unconstitutional. 
In the present case, perhaps the greatest injustice is 
that the defendant could not have known, prior to his arrest, 
that his alleged actions would subject him to the penalties of 
this third degree felony charge under this section. The 
language of the statute leaves to the police the discretion to 
choose, by their own standards or preferences, what acts will 
be prosecuted and which will not. 
The Utah Supreme Court when faced with a criminal section 
proscribing two or more persons to conspire "to commit any act 
injurious ... to public morals. . 11 stated that the offense 
needs: 
"to give adequate guidance to those who would be 
law-abiding, to advise defendants to the nature of the offense 
with which they are charged, or to guide courts in trying those 
who are accused. 11 State v. Musser (Utah 1950), 223 P. 2d 193. 
The Court concluded the statute was unconstitutionally 
vague. 
The issue presented is what does the phrase "indecent 
liberties" mean? By the statute itself, it means some act 
other than touching the anus or genitals of another, since the 
phrase "indecent liberties" is separated from the portion of 
the statute specifying that conduct by the disjunctive 
"otherwise." 
An attemot was made by the Utah Court to define "in-
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decent liberties" in State v. MacMillan, 46 u. 19, 145 P. 833 
(1915) , at 834. 
Its efforts failed in a cloud of propriety, calling 
"indecent" "self defining," and labelling as "indecent" speci-
fically disclosing the defendant's particularity. 
It should be noted as well, that the issue raised in 
MacMillan, supra was the sufficiency of the information and not 
the adequacy of the statute under constitutional provisions. 
What other act then is an "indecent liberty" under the 
Statute? A non-consented kiss, embrace or a touching of the 
abdomen or some other non-genital area of the body? Is a 
touching even required? 
The Merriam-Webster Dictionary, Copyright 1974, defines 
"indecent" as "Not decent; unbecoming, unseemly; also morally 
offensive." 
Indecent is an adjective which varies and differs with 
each individual's judgment. The definition attached by indi-
viduals varies with each individuals morals. No strict defin-
ition may be attached since morals of each individual or corn-
rnunity varies. It may be offensive to one person to embrace 
another and to another it would not. 
The statutory interpretations given by the Utah Courts 
and others are of no help. State v. MacMillan supra finds the 
term "self-defining." 
An analagous case to the present determination is State 
of Kansas v. Conley, 216 Kan. 66, 531 P.2d 36 (1975). 
There the information charged the defendant in the general 
language of K.S.A. 21-3503 (1) (b) with committing the offense of 
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of whether the language used is so vague that it fails to warn 
as to conduct sought to be proscribed. The State argued that 
the term "indecent liberties" conveys such warning to persons 
of common intelligence. 
The statute in Conley, supra stated: 
"Indecent liberties with a child. (1) (b) Any 
lewd fondling or touching of the person of . the 
child . done . . . with the intent to arouse or 
satisfy the sexual desires of ... the offender." 
The Court noted that "the particular name or label of 
an offense cannot be used to bootstrap a statutory definition 
otherwise lacking in specificity. It seems doubtful the legis-
lature meant to proscribe every form of touching of the person 
even though some degree of sexuality be present as in youthful 
kissing or embracing, yet that can be argued from the language 
used. Where ascertainable standards of guilt declaring just 
what conduct is forbidden." 531 P.2d at 39. 
The Kansas Court next met this question in State v. Wells, 
573 P.2d 580 (1977), after the statute had been amended to state, 
in pertinent part, "Any lewd fondling or touching II The 
Court accepted that as curing the defect noted in the Conley 
opinion supra. 
The defendant herein argues that the Utah Statute does 
not reach beyond the language found inadequate in Conley. There 
the Court found that the title "indecent liberties" combined with 
the defining phrase "fondling or touching" was not sufficient to 
declare what conduct was forbidden and therefore did not satisfy 
constitutional requirements of due process. How then could the 
Utah Statute in question satisfy the Conley test? 
The combination of "forcible sexual abuse" and "indecent 
-16-
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liberties" is even less descriptive than the statute found 
deficient in Conley and therefore could no more satisfy the 
constitutional requirements of due process. 
An individual is not given fair warning of the statute's 
proscription as required by the due process clause when the term 
may vary from one individual to another, or one community to 
another community, and where such a statute does not serve to 
warn of proscribed conduct. 
POINT II. THE EVIDENCE IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT, 
'lhe appellant asserts that the evidence is entirely so 
lacking and unsubstantial that reasonable men could not possibly 
reach a guilty verdict beyond a reasonable doubt in that the 
! ' 
State of Utah failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) I. 
the appellant caused others to take indecent liberties with Toni 
Kennedy, his wife, (2} without her consent as defined in Section 
76-5-406, U.C.A. (1953}, as amended, and (3) such acts, if any, 
were for the purpose and with the specific intent to arouse or 
gratify the sexual desires of the appellant. 
From a reading of the trial transcript, the appellant 
cannot find any evidence in the least which shows that the 
appellant caused another to take indecent liberties with Toni 
Kennedy. 
According to the appellant's testimony on cross examin-
ation and as supported by the rest of the transcript, the appell~ 
merely allowed Toni Kennedy's sexual appetite to occur in order to 
keep peace. See page 65 of the trial transcript. 
The most that appears is that the appellant allowed the 
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others to engage in acts with Toni Kennedy. The most that can 
be said is that the appellant did not stop others from engaging 
in sexual acts with Toni Kennedy. 
In particular, it should be noted at page 14 of the 
transcript that the appellant did not even like the individual 
known as Rick according to the complainant and it is hard to 
understand how or why the appellant would cause Rick to have 
sexual relations with Toni Kennedy, the appellant's wife, un-
less Toni Kennedy in fact wished to engage in such conduct, 
particularly since Rick had tried to get Toni Kennedy to divorce 
the appellant in March of 1979. See page 28 of the trial 
transcript line 6 through 10. 
'lhis brings us to the more essential element which is 
missing from the States case. 
Section 76-5-406(1) and (2}, U.C.A. (1953), as amended, 
defines when an act is without the consent of the alleged victim. 
Section 76-5-406(1) indicates there is no consent: 
When the actor compels the victim to submit or 
participate by force that overcomes such earnest 
resistance as might reasonably be expected under 
the circumstances. 
Section 76-5-406(2) indicates there is no consent when: 
The actor compels the victim to submit or participate 
by any threat that would prevent resistance by a 
person of ordinary resolution. 
The remaining portions of Sections 76-5-406 are clearly 
not applicable to this case. 
The most recent pronouncement of the Utah Supreme Court 
is the case of State v. Myers, No. 16223, filed January 24, 1980. 
In that case the defendant pinned the complainants hands 
to the seat and after the occurrence she was crying, her skirt 
-18-
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was ripped, her blouse was torn, a strip of her hair was missing, 
and she had red marks on her arm. Additionally, she was taken 
to the hospital to confirm recent intercourse and patches of 
bruises and scratching were observed on her body. 
In the case of State v. Reddish, 550 P.2d 728 (1976) 
the Utah Supreme Court noted that the victim screamed, resisted, 
tried to get away, but the defendant seized and held her, choked 
her and threatened her life which overcame her resistance. The 
Court noted she immediately called the police and a physical 
examination was done on the victim which noted that she had 
fresh scratches on her face and bruises on her neck. Additional-
ly, the officers had found that the ground was torn up where the 
struggle was alleged to have taken place. 
statute: 
The Court noted at page 729 after referring to the 
From that statute it is seen that the overcoming 
of the victim's will can be accomplished either 
by force or threats; and it may also be ac-
complished by a combination of them, which the 
States evidence tends to show here .•.. to 
meet the requirements of making clear to the jury 
that the force and threats had to be of such 
character and such an effect on the prosecutrix 
as to overcome an earnest desire on her part to 
resist. 
In the case of State v. Nuney, 520 ~.2d 881 (1974), 
the Utah Supreme Court noted that the prosecutrix had pleaded 
with the defendant to take her home and that the defendant 
ordered her into the back seat and threatened her with violence 
if she did not comply. The prosecutrix testified she greatly 
feared physical abuse in that an inquiry was made by one of the 
men as to the location of a knife which was in the car. 
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pick the lock on the car of the automobile, but the Court noted 
the prosecut~ix was unaware that the knife would be used for 
that purpose. 
Additionally in Nuney, the Court stated that a police 
car approached the automobile and a companion of the defendant 
fled and hid in the bushes and the prosecutrix cried out she 
had been raped. 
The Court referred to Section 76-5-406(2) of the present 
criminal code and affirmed the conviction in the case of Nuney. 
Cbmpare the three foregoing cases with that of the 
appellants. 
At page 8 of the transcript the prosecutrix stated that 
she had sexual intercourse with a man she called B.J., and she 
stated at line 30 with reference to what she did with B.J. that: 
I just wanted to hurry and get it over with, 
but he wanted to try all kinds of different 
positions, and I said I didn't want to .... 
At page 9 of the transcript after the appellant had 
helped B.J. make his bed on the couch, the prosecutrix indicated 
at line 25, the prosecutrix said B.J. had said she had let him 
finish, "so I had intercourse with B.J., and then Charles had 
intercourse, well, just fast to get it over with, and then they 
went out of the bedroom and out in the front room, and I went 
to sleep." 
The prosecutrix indicated at page 12 of the transcript 
she had intercourse with B.J. two or three more nights. But 
she never called the police nor were any threats mentioned 
against her. At page 12, line 17 the prosecutrix merely in-
dicated that the appellant said she had to keep doing it until 
~ the truck was fixed. At line 19 she goes on to note, "It Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
wasn't bad enough that I had to go to bed with him but he was 
very obnoxious." 
At page 13, line 11, the prosecutrix answered that 
"My main restraint was begging Charles not to make me, but he 
would stand idly by and let me. On the last night B.J. stayed 
there I did put up enough force, even though Charles kept 
urging, B.J. didn't have intercourse with me, but Charles did." 
As noted in the Affidavit introduced a preliminary 
hearing Mr. B.E. Marshall, B.J., did not know he was having 
intercourse without the prosecutrix's consent and apparently 
the State believed him since he was and has never been charged 
in this matter to the best of counsel's knowledge. 
'lhe next incident the prosecutrix refers to is with a 
man referred to as Rick. According to the prosecutrix at page 
14 of the transcript, Rick had been at their house in March of 
1979, and the appellant did not like Rick and according to page 
16 of the transcript the prosecutrix had apparently had sex 
with Rick before. See line 3 of page 16. 
According to page 16 the appellant had left and later 
returned, at which point at page 17, line 1, "he told me to go 
to bed with him so I didn't know what else to do, so I did." 
.According to page 17, line 26, the prosecutrix had 
sexual relations with Rick one more time. 
The prosecutrix did testify at page 19, starting at 
line 10 why she had not earlier complained. She indicated that 
the appellant had the habit of sitting her down for hours at a 
time and going from everything from her folks to her job. Any-
thing he could think of to this thing where he wanted me to go 
to bed with these men, and would go c-~ =':,::.: ~ ... ~, · 
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about it. 
The prosecutrix states at page 19 that various threats 
were made but there was no testimony that the appellant ever 
even attempted any such threats. 
At page 20, the prosecutrix testified the appellant 
tried to run over her with a truck when she left him but there 
is no link that these threats were connected with the alleged 
violations that the appellant is convicted of. 
The only actual physical violence that took place in fact 
is related at page 21, line 30 wherein the prosecutrix took a 
butcher knife after the appellant. At page 56 the appellant 
explains he held her down on the above-referred to occassions 
to keep her from getting the butcher knives and from committing 
suicide. 
It is clear from reading the transcript that the 
prosecutrix drank a great deal and smoked marijuana often while 
the appellant did not. 
It is equally clear that the sexual activity was her 
idea and not the appellants. Additionally, with regard to the 
letter that was introduced into evidence, it is clear from the 
record that the Court did not take it into his verdict. See 
page 54, line 12, wherein the Court stated it had nothing to do 
with the transaction the appellant was on trial for. 
The facts in this case simply do not arise to the level 
of overcoming such earnest resistance as might reasonably be 
expected under the circumstances or that the actor compelled 
the prosecutrix to submit or participate by any threat that 
would prevent resistance by a person of ordinary resistance. 
The appellant simply asks the Court to read the entire 
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transcript for itself to determine wh .... '- ........... _. _______ _ 
prosecutrix consented or not. 
In the case of People v. Keeney, 293 N.E.2d 492 (1973) th 
Illinois Court reversed the trial Court setting without a jury. 
The Keeney case is similar to ours, in that the defendant 
there was charged with aiding in a rape. 
There the Court noted: 
It is a fundamental rule in such cases that in order 
to prove the charge of forcible rape there must be 
evidence to show that the act was committed by 
force and against the will of the female, and if 
she has the use of her faculties and physical 
powers the evidence must show such resistance 
as will demonstrate that the act was against her 
will .... It is also fundamental that voluntary 
submission by the female, while she has power to 
resist, no matter how reluctantly yielded, amounts 
to consent and removes from the act an essential 
element of rape. 
The Court in Keeney noted that the picture of a girl, "perhaps ~ 
times unstable who engaged frequently and willingly in sexual 
intercourse with males and almost as frequently expressed pangs 
of regret for her prior acts." 
Such are the cases with Zamora v. State, 449 S.W.2d 43 
(1969) and People v. Taylor, 268 N.E.2d 865 (1971) where rape 
charges were dismissed by reasons of giving consent particular-
ly since no outrage was immediately noted by the prosecutrix and 
since the State attempted to rely on fear of the prosecutrix. 
The Court in Taylor noted after it stated that resistance 
is not necessary if the prosecutrix was: 
paralyzed by fear or overcome by superior strength 
of her attacker; that it is, however, fundamental 
that in order to prove the charge of forcible rape 
there must be evidence to show the act was committed 
by force and against the will of the female, and if 
she has the use of her faculties and physical 
powers, the evidence must show such resistance as 
will demonstrate that the act was against her will. 
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In our case it is hard to believe that the prosecutrix, 
if not before, could have complained between the 4th day of 
August and the 22nd day of August, 1980. 
What seems more likely is that since she filed after 
the 22nd of August of 1979, that her sister had told her 
mother who told her father what was going on notwithstanding 
the prosecutrix's statements to the contrary. See page 31, 
line 27 through 30 of the transcript; and further after Rick 
persisted in his demands for the prosecutrix to divorce the 
Appellant even though the prosecutrix denied the same events 
referred to. 
According to Sheri Blackburn, the prosecutrix's sister, 
after she discovered Rick under the covers -- see page 42, line 
16 through 17, when the defendant was not around and after she 
was introduced to Rick on the 22nd of August, 1979 -- line 
25-27 -- Sheri Blackburn overheard the prosecutrix state at 
page 43, line 12, "you are not going to put me out on the street 
again." Nevertheless, Sheri Blackburn stated she was in another 
room and she did not know what the argument was over. See page 
44, lines 2 through 8. 
The Appellant was called to the stand and gave an en-
tirely different version of the events. However, the point is 
that the State did not prove its own case, even disregarding 
the statements of the Appellant which directly contradict the 
prosecutrix's testimony. 
In Zamora the Court stated: 
But something more than the mere want of consent 
must also be shown; there must have been 
resistance on the part of the female dependent 
in amount on circumstances surrounding her at 
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and the accused. Moreover, the resistance 
must have been real and not feigned. Threats 
apart, her failure to make every exertion in 
her power under the circumstances to prevent 
the crime will result in a presumption of 
consent. 
It must be remembered that in our case, the prosecutrix 
was not injured in any way, nor -- what seems even more odd --
neither of the people she had sex with were ever charged with 
rape. How could the prosecutrix consent to have sex with the 
men not charged, but nevertheless claim such sex was without 
her consent? The State certainly could have charged B.J. 
Marshall since the State of Utah had him sign an Affidavit. 
It seems clear that the State merely wished to remove the 
Appellant from Nephi since it deemed him an undesirable, regard-
less of how it did it even if an innocent man had to be found 
guilty to do it. 
Finally, the prosecutrix admitted that she had been a 
prostitute in Virginia, see page 25, and it is clear that aside 
from the fact that consent was given by the prosecutrix pursuant 
to Section 76-5-406, even according to her testimony, the sexual 
acts were done in order that the truck of the Appellant's could 
be fixed and not for the appellant's sexual gratification, and 
no satisfactory explanation can be found as to her sexual 
activity with Rick other than the prosecutrix wished to engage 
in it. 
CONCLUSION 
The guilty verdicts of the trial Court should be reversed 
and the information ordered dismissed in accordance with the fore-
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